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Being asked to write a preface to Chris Freeman’s Selected Essays has been for me an honour 
and a privilege.  Chris has been for almost thirty years a loved friend, an influential mentor 
and an extremely insightful collaborator.  However, he does not need any introduction.  As 
one of the most prominent founding fathers of the economics of innovation as a distinct sub-
discipline of social science and as influential maître-à-penser within and outside evolutionary 
economics  and  economic  history,  he  would  have  deserved  for  quite  a  while  the  most 
prestigious recognition in economics, together with social scientists like G. Myrdal, K. Arrow, 
H.  Simon,  D.  North,  and  a  few  other  seminal  contributors  to  the  contemporary  “political 
economy”.    A  preface  praising  the  intellectual  achievements  of  Chris  Freeman  would 
inevitably be both partial and redundant.  Rather, it might be more useful, especially for the 
younger readers, to briefly flag some of the themes discussed in the essays which follow and 
highlight the ways they relate to the ongoing evolutionary research programme in economics 
as well as other streams of socio-economic analysis. 
Chris Freeman (together with a small number of scholars on the other side of the Atlantic – 
prominently Richard Nelson and Nathan Rosenberg) has established the very foundations of 
the economic analysis of scientific and technological research and of the ways technological 
knowledge becomes incorporated into new products and processes and ultimately turns out as 
a fundamental engine of economic growth.  Freeman has been indeed one of the pioneers 
investigating difficult but fundamental questions such as the inter-relation between scientific 
and technological advances, the characteristics of innovating firms, the nature of institutions 
supporting technological innovation: the reader is still going to find fresh insight in the old 
Freeman (1962) and (1993),  Freeman et al. (1963) and (1965), while of course the classic 
Freeman (1982) and (1994) are a must in the field of economics of innovation.
1 
The foregoing analyses are also at root of the essays which follow.  However the emphasis of 
most of them (and also of Freeman (1987)) is on the institutions grounding “capitalism as an 
engine of progress” as Nelson (1980) put it. 
A major theme which offers a unifying thread across the essays, and also provides the title of 
the collection, concerns the nature of systems of innovation and in particular National Systems 
of Innovation and of Production (hereafter NSIP).  In fact, a careful reading of the following 
essays and more emphatically the conclusions reveal that NSIP are for Freeman a privileged 
level of analysis of the interactions and co-evolutionary dynamics among five sub-domains, 
and related institutions, governing 
i.  the generation of scientific knowledge; 
ii.  the  development,  improvement,  adoption  of  new  artefacts  and  new  techniques  of 
production (that is, the domain of technology); 
iii.  the “economic machine” which organizes the production and distribution of goods, 
services and incomes; 
iv.  the political and legal structure; and finally, 
v.  the cultural domain-shaping values, norms and customs.
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1 For a reconstruction of some elements of the history of the “economics of science”, see Nelson (2006) 
2 In fact, as  Chris Freeman implicitly suggests – and I happen to agree – it is at  national level  where the 
interaction among these five domains appears more clearly.  See also Nelson (1993) and Lundvall (1993).  This 
does not mean to say that a germane notion of systems of innovation cannot be fruitfully applied at sectoral level: 
on the latter, see Malerba (2004) - 3- 
It  is  indeed  a  formidably  challenging  research  programme,  posing  basic  interpretative 
questions, at the same level of generality – even if different in their ingredients – as the 
“theories of history” addressed by A. Smith, Marx, Weber, Keynes and Schumpeter, among a 
few distinguished others.  One could call it the “grand political economy”, trying to answer 
some of the questions which, frankly, I consider to be among the ultimately interesting ones: 
what has triggered and what keeps the momentum to self-sustained exponential growth in 
developed economies since the Industrial Revolution? How do we explain the patterns of 
catching-up,  falling-behind  and  forging-ahead  historically  observed  among  different 
countries? What are the factors underlying the long-term fluctuations in the time profile of 
economic  aggregates  such  as  GDP,  productivity,  employment,  etc.  at  both  “world”  and 
national levels? What is the relative importance, in the answer to the foregoing questions, of 
technological vs. organizational vs. institutional factors?   
Chris  Freeman’s  conjectures  together  with  his  enormously  insightful  exercises  of 
“appreciative theorizing” – as Nelson and Winter (1984) call the genre of bottom-up history-
based interpretations – are nearly opposite to any quest for the “magic bullet” enterprise.  
Hence, as Chris remarks in the conclusions, the “ultimate driver” of socio-economic history is 
unlikely to be an invariant Marxian tension between “forces of production”, “relations of 
production” and “political/ideological superstructures”.  By the same token, one is equally 
unlikely  to  find  any  ultimate  “Schumpeterian  driver”  of  long-term  growth  just  based  on 
technological  innovation  –  as  important  as  it  is  –  always  holding  irrespective  of  the 
(institutional and cultural) context conditions.  And, needless to say, any account of the magic 
bullet in terms of “just get the incentives right and you will be OK” is so far away from Chris’ 
views that he does not even mention it (I happen to fully agree with him, but I shall briefly get 
back below to the issue since it features such a big part in the contemporary “spirit of the 
times” in social sciences). 
C.  Freeman’s  first  fundamental  conjectures  entail  that  each  of  the  foregoing  domains  of 
analysis  maintains  a  good  degree  of  “evolutionary  autonomy”:  to  give  a  few  examples, 
science  to  a  significant  extent  (even  if  not  fully)  evolves  according  to  its  own  selection 
criteria; so do political institutions and cultural traits; collectively shared norms might well 
self-reinforce even when driving to technological downgrading and income deterioration; and 
the list is much longer. 
The second interpretative conjecture, further developed also in his joint works with Carlota 
Perez and Francisco Louça (cf. among others Freeman and Perez (1988) and Freeman and 
Louça (2001)) is that the observed dynamic properties of the various (national) economies and 
their relative performances as well as the dynamics of international economy as a whole, 
ought  to  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  congruence  (or.  alternatively,  varying  degrees  of 
mismatching) among the foregoing subdomains.  Ambitious as it is, I find the elements of a 
“theory of contemporary history” sketched out in Freeman and Perez (1988), Perez (2002), 
Freeman (2002), Freeman and Louça (2001) both highly suggestive and quite convincing.  In 
such an interpretation the national specificities in the coupled dynamics among the five above 
domains  account  for  e.g.  the  English  emergence  to  leadership  in  the  first  Industrial 
Revolution, the subsequent catching-up and forging-ahead of the USA and Germany, all the 
way to the contemporary success of far-eastern economies like Korea.  It is an interpretation 
which bears major overlappings with the – to a good extent French – “regulation school” (see 
Boyer  (1988a)  and  (1988b),  and,  among  the  non-French  contributors,  Dosi  and  Orsenigo 
(1988), and also Coriat and Dosi (1998), for discussions of the links between such a breed of 
institutionalism and evolutionary theories in economics).  If anything, there is relatively more 
emphasis upon science and technology in Freeman and colleagues and more emphasis on 
politics, conflict and governance institutions in Aglietta, Boyer, Coriat, and other “regulation” - 4- 
colleagues.  However, this should be a second-order issue, in principle to be clarified on the 
grounds of finer comparative historical evidence. 
Some  basic  “congruence”  or  “combinatorics”  story  is  also  at  the  core  of  the  variety  of 
capitalism approach to the comparative assessment of the political economies and revealed 
performances  of  e.g.  “laissez-faire”  Anglo-Saxon  capitalism  vs.  “corporatist”,  German  or 
Japanese, breeds of capitalist socio-economic organization (cf. Hall and Soskice (2001), and 
also Cimoli et al. (2006) on development patterns).  And, finally, C. Freeman’s history-based 
generalizations are well in tune with more formal explorations of the consistency properties 
(or lack of them) among forms of governance of information, incentives, financial flows and 
product  markets  (cf.  the  seminal  work  of  Aoki  (2001);  for  some  links  with  evolutionary 
theories of technological change see also Aoki and Dosi (1992)). 
A major methodological element shared by Freeman and colleagues with these other streams 
of analysis is the explicit focus upon comparisons among discrete institutional forms
3, which 
distinctly combines mechanisms of knowledge generation and of governance of economic 
coordination.  So for example, in M. Aoki and co-authors the archetypal “Japanese firm” 
differs  from  the  archetypal  “American  firm”  in  terms  of  distinct  organizational  attributes 
determining among other features the way information flows across the hierarchical layers of 
the firm, the relationships between internal promotion mechanisms and modes of access to the 
labour market, and the links between the firm itself and finance (Aoki (2001)). 
The emphasis of Aoki et al, as well as “variety-of-capitalism” streams of analysis, is largely, 
although not exclusively, cross-sectional, addressing the structural differences between, say, 
the US, Japan, Germany and Sweden over the last fifty years or so. The recurrent question is 
whether  such  differences,  even  if  they  existed  in  the  past,  will  continue  to  exist  in  the 
“globalization era”.  Chris Freeman convincingly argues that they will.  I fully agree with him 
and shall add some brief comments below.  Come as it may, Freeman puts an even greater 
emphasis on the historical evolution of distinct political-economy regimes associated with 
distinct  techno-economic  paradigms  shaping  the  overall  organization  of  knowledge 
accumulation and production under e.g. an electricity-/internal-combustion/mass production 
mode vs. an ICT-driven one (cf. Freeman and Perez (1988), and Freeman and Louça (2001) 
among others) . 
I cannot enter here into the details of the overlaps and differences between different analyses 
however  grounded  into  some  institutional  combinatorics  concerning  the  performance 
comparisons  between  different  “institutional  types”  and  the  assessment  of  their  genesis, 
mechanisms of  self-maintenance and evolution.  The common bottom line is the focus upon 
the identification of the combinations which make, say, the “research university” mode of 
generating scientific knowledge congruent with the modes of its industrial exploitation which 
in turn might or might not be congruent with the ways labour and financial markets work, etc.  
From a modelling point of view one is still at the beginning, but the already mentioned works 
by  Aoki  and  colleagues  offer  suggestive  hints  (see  also  Marengo  (1992)  for  a  largely 
unexploited style of micro institutional comparisons).  In any case, note that in such a style of 
analysis, complementarities –or lack of them– and congruence –or mismatching– are the name 
of the game.  Hence, to illustrate, in such a perspective it might not come as a surprise, say 
that “Confucianism” under some institutional set-ups might appear as a hindrance to industrial 
development while in others might be a source of “progressive” social norms; that “labour 
market rigidities” in some contexts are just “rigidities” while in others are powerful drivers to 
within-firm knowledge accumulation and cooperative behaviours… 
                                            
3 The merits of such methodology, on more microeconomic grounds, are stressed also by Williamson (1999) - 5- 
To repeat, let me emphasize the still preliminary stage of such types of formal analysis – as 
distinct from a long and noble pedigree of “qualitative” historical analyses, ranging from A. 
Smith  to  C.  Cipolla,  from  Marx  to  Landes,  from  M.  Weber  to  R.  Dore,  indeed  to  Chris 
Freeman.  As an almost symmetric opposite term of comparison, many of the younger readers 
are certainly familiar with the “political economy” with solid formal neoclassical roots (for a 
thorough statement see Persson and Tabellini (2000)).  Call it the “Neo Political Economy” 
(NPE).    In  the  NPE  world,  one  studies  the  equilibrium  effects  of  different  policies  and 
political  set-ups  grounded  in  rational  responses  of  invariantly  maximizing  agents.  
Philosophically germane to that stream of analysis is the search for some sort of invariant 
“meta-production function” that is supposed to parsimoniously describe the transformation of 
whatever “inputs” which might range from physical capital investment all the way to the 
protestant  ethic,  the  propensity  to  reproduce,  the  resistance  to  malaria,  the  degrees  of 
education,  the  distance  from  the  equator,  etc.  into  some  socio-economic  performance 
“output”.  (A concise example of the genre is Sachs and Warner (1997); elements of caution 
on the outcomes of the whole exercise are in Easterly  (2001)). The device is simple and 
deceivingly innocent: in fact, on a couple of occasions even Chris Freeman in the essays 
which follow makes a heuristic use of production functions of the kind!  Personally, I am all 
in  favour  of  the  search  for  statistical  regularities  possibly  characterizing  the  development 
process and its underlying political economy.  However, as I voiced earlier my scepticism 
regarding  the  quest  for  the  “magic  bullet”  explanations,  I  am  equally  sceptical  about  the 
enterprise of estimating some kind of “meta-recipe” able to sort out the relative contributions 
of e.g. democracy, degrees of distributional inequality, knowledge, the rule-of-law, etc. within 
some invariant “meta-cuisine” (as extreme in that vein, I once heard a very famous economist 
presenting  his  own  “theory  of  history”  grounded  into  a  production  function  which  was 
supposed to be invariant in its functional form from the Stone Age to the present!).  In fact, in 
a world ridden with complementarities the search for the “meta-recipe” looses much of its 
interpretative power. 
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What does one do then? Well, first, we should all continue and refine upon the exercises  of 
“reasoned history” of which Chris Freeman has offered convincing templates.  Second, we 
certainly should refine our knowledge of the stylized facts of development, trying to identify 
the  invariances  and  the  discontinuities  both  in  time  series  and  cross-sectionally  across 
different groups of countries (building upon some of the early classic contributions of Burns, 
Mitchell, Kuznets and Kaldor, and adding novel microeconomic knowledge; on this point see 
also  Dosi,  Freeman  and  Fabiani  (1993)).    A  third,  complementary,  line  of  investigation, 
involves in my view the construction of models –“as simple as possible, but not simpler”, as 
Einstein  once  put  it!–  able  to  generate  (and  thus,  in  some  sense  explain)  the  foregoing 
“stylized facts”.  Not surprisingly my preference goes for models of an evolutionary kind but I 
wholeheartedly welcome a healthy competition between evolutionary and more mainstream 
models aimed at interpreting a commonly recognized set of phenomena, ranging from the 
long-term properties of the time series of economic aggregates such as GDP, productivity, 
employment, etc. all the way to micro phenomena such as those concerning the patterns of 
innovation, corporate performance, and the dynamics of industrial structures. 
The subtitle of Chris Freeman’s selection of writings is “Essays in evolutionary economics”.  
They are in fact genuinely “evolutionary” at least in the sense of the evolutionary research 
programme  whose  building  blocks  one  tries  to  spell  out  in  different  ways  in  Nelson  and 
                                            
4 And of course, the fact that one is able to estimate interaction terms is a far cry from the “combinatorics” 
property that, say, A when together with B and C might have a beneficial effect on growth while it may have a 
negative one when it comes just together with C and in presence of D. For a similar argument concerning the 
simpler domain of production theory, cf. Dosi and Grazzi (2006) - 6- 
Winter (1982), Dosi and Nelson (1994) and Dosi and Winter (2002).  At a first look, the spirit 
of  Freeman’s  essays  significantly  differs  from  a  good  deal  of  contemporary  evolutionary 
contributions, which mostly address micro and industry-level aspects of technological and 
organizational  change  (although  not  exclusively:  for  recent  assessments  also  covering 
progress  in  the  –  formal  and  “qualitative”  –  understanding  of  growth  as  an  evolutionary 
process, cf. Nelson and Winter (2002) and Verspagen (2005)).  In my view, there is indeed a 
fundamental complementarity between micro investigations and the more macro perspective 
running  through  Chris’  essays.    In  fact,  the  latter  are  remarkable  examples  whereby 
thoroughly evolutionary micro stories are the underlying thread of the much broader, macro 
co-evolutionary histories.  In Freeman’s world this running back and forth between the micro, 
the macro and the range of complementary institutions is natural, as it should be.  So the 
reader will appreciate in the essays that follow insightful pieces of analysis of the painstaking 
emergence of the  ICT-centred techno-economic paradigm and of the national specificities 
influencing the modes and rates of its diffusion.  In all that, as already mentioned, Chris 
Freeman’s thesis is that also in “globalization era”  nations (and “quasi nations”, such as the 
European Union) will continue to play a fundamental role as entities driving policy-making 
and institution-building.  As so will the “visible hand” of large enterprises play such a role, 
even if their organizational structure and their sectors of principal activity are changing as 
compared to the earlier “Fordist” electro-mechanical paradigm. 
I was mentioning the fact that Chris Freeman’s  works – those reproduced in this book and his 
whole production – are a template of an analytical style continuously relating micro events 
(say, specific innovations), “meso” dynamics (e.g. the competitiveness and the patterns of 
evolution  of  particular  industries)  and  macro  patterns  concerning  income  growth, 
employment,  relative  success/decline  of  particular  countries.    Such  a  style  of  analysis  is 
indeed too rare a virtue, also in the evolutionary camp.  As a correlate, even in the latter there 
is far too little reflection on the broad collective implications of the dynamics of innovation, 
“creative disruption” and industrial evolution.  Putting it telegraphically, in the large fuzzy 
“evolutionary community” – in my view – there is a bit too much Schumpeter and far too 
little  Keynes.    And  the  imbalance  is  so  high  that  sometimes  one  suspects  that  some 
evolutionary scholars are not too uncomfortable to see all their micro-foundations summarized 
by, say, some neat equilibrium trajectory at macro level. And some might not even shiver at 
the  mother of all evolutionary mistakes, that is M. Friedman’s “hand waving theorem” re-
stating Mr. Pangloss’ proposition that “everything we observe must be optimal, otherwise any 
superior competitor would have wiped it out…”.  At this point in time, one ought to leave one 
of the numerous falsifications of the statement to graduate students: however, for those just 
educated in Chicago and intellectual surroundings, early criticisms are in Winter (1964) and 
(1975).   
Chris Freeman on the contrary belongs to that group of evolutionary scholars who believes in 
the  widespread  possibility  of  multiple  evolutionary  paths  (incidentally  note  that  such 
multiplicity  erodes  any  interpretative  value  to  the  proposition  that  evolution  is  a  sort  of 
decentralized  optimization  device:  more  on  it  in  Castaldi  and  Dosi  (2006)).    Chris,  if  I 
understand  him  well,  is  quite  comfortable  with  varying  degrees  of  path-dependence  in 
technological and institutional dynamics.  In fact I trust he is quite comfortable with Paul 
David’s  proposition  that  “institutions  are  carriers  of  history”  (David  (1994))  with  all  the 
inertia that they entail.  Granted that, the whole – personal and intellectual –history of Chris 
Freeman has been marked by the passionate search for the degrees of freedom for purposeful 
human action apt to steer the evolution of socio-economic institutions toward progressive 
social objectives – including the international diffusion of new technologies and industrial 
development, equitable patterns of income distribution, employment and democratic rights, - 7- 
the reduction of environmental rape.  I am sure to interpret also Chris’ thoughts in stating that 
in fact these objectives have been what motivated him and quite a few of us to understand in 
detail how the socio-economic machine works precisely in order to identify the levers and the 
“windows of opportunity” in order to change it.  Chris has done a lot in this respect, trying 
also to spell out normative proposals at an institutional and policy level (cf. Freeman (1992), 
Freemand and Soete (1993) and also the essays in this volume).   
Few others, in the past and in the near present have voiced overlapping objectives (see among 
others, Nelson (1997), Hirschman (1973 and 1995), Dore (2004), Stiglitz (2006)).  However it 
is only fair to admit the minority role that all these voices, (indeed, our voices) have played 
especially over the last quarter of a century as compared to a “spirit of the time” roughly 
grounded into some version of the neoclassical orthodoxy, but – even more importantly – into 
some unquestioned faith in the “magic of the market”, “put incentives right and everything 
will turn out in place”, and other dangerous acts of faith of this sort.  Chris Freeman has been 
one of the few who basically did not care about this tide.  At last, the world is (reluctantly) 
sobering  up  from  a  sinister  illusion  whereby  “globalization”,  “the  new  Economy”,  “more 
market,  less  policies”,  etc.  should  have  been  the  universal  panaceas.    That  might  indeed 
correspond also to a “window of opportunity” at the policy level.  But one will not be able to 
seize it if the “projects for better worlds” are not accompanied by a careful, dispassionate, 
rigorous analysis of the anatomy and evolution of the contemporary socio-economic fabric.  
This is one of the precious lessons that my friend Chris continues to give us. 
 - 8- 
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